Alternative Options for Western Military Support for Ukraine

Greetings! Today’s article will briefly outline an alternative option for Western military support for Ukraine.

Keep the comments civil, on topic, and proper.

Current State of Western Support

BLUF:

While Western [mostly American] military support has greatly helped Ukraine in their conflict with Russia, the military aid has not been sufficient enough for Ukraine to win and is not likely to be sustained at the same levels in 2023. This has very significant implications going forward.

What is needed is a sustainable and more pragmatic form of military support that could yield similar results as the current plan, but with less risk.

The Issues with Current Support

Ukraine has no means to procure and no reliable defense industry to produce their own military needs for a conflict of this nature. Ukrainian capabilities are limited to small-scale munitions, material solutions, etc.

Most of the advanced Western donated equipment to Ukraine is fully reliant on 3rd party support and is expensive to maintain [as are most other items]. While these weapons and platforms are excellent options, given the circumstances, the customer [Kiev] is incapable of self-sustainment, incapable of payment, and therefore, numbers will remain limited or remain in a low state of readiness for longer than desired timeframes.

From a Ukrainian perspective, one can reasonably assume that if given the choice between a limited number of platforms with advanced capabilities or a large number of platforms of lesser capabilities but still superior or equal to that of their adversary, the choice would be fairly obvious.

Sadly, this has not been sufficiently acknowledged or factored by the West.

A Pragmatic Approach

The West has to come to terms with whether or not it will be able to sustain the Ukrainian war efforts under the current path with equal to or more support as it has done for the last 292 or so days. If it cannot, then there will be major issues ahead for Ukraine.

An alternative option would be to take advantage of this current decrease in operational tempo and provide the following support:

• 4,000 JLTVs and associated predecessors as well as M113s.
• Thousands of 82mm and 120mm mortars with associated munitions.
• ITAS gen 1 and gen 2 along with thousands of BGM-71s [Tows].

Justification for Proposed Support

While most of these items are legacy items, they can be provided and sustained with little effort. If provided in mass quantities, it basically becomes a numbers game.

The JLTV and other platforms can be equipped with various crew-served weapons, with RWS systems, and are cheap, nimble, and expendable. These vehicles and material solutions are viable for decentralized, small-scale operations and if correctly employed and equipped with stand-off weapons and UAS support, would be very effective. Over time, the accumulated effect would produce a kill-loss ratio that was favorable, sustainable, and economical in comparison to the current methodology. Also, these can be provided in quantity as there are thousands of them.

120mm mortars are relatively easy to employ, produce, and support. They do not require large crews, large PAAs and can be just as effective as towed Howitzers if used correctly. While they lack ranges past 7,000m, they can be rapidly employed and moved in a very short timeframe by a well-trained crew. Given the exceptionally large operating area, a highly mobile, rapidly employed Indirect Fire asset with great sustainability and survivability in large quantities is a superior option to the current methodology of old towed Howitzers with a dwindling stock of short-range munitions.

Effectiveness of Proposed Solutions

As an example, a vehicle outlined above, with a crew of 5, can employ a 120mm mortar, fire multiple rounds, and displace in a quicker fashion than a towed system. Supplementing the current IDF capabilities with a vastly more durable IDF asset will enhance lethality, reduce reliance on 105mm and 155mm munitions, thus preserving the stock for more critical targets as well as provide a greater and more flexible IDF option and response.

ITAS and Tows:

While dated, the West has thousands of these venerable munitions and systems in its collective arsenal. If, say, 2,000 older ITAS systems and 8,000 to 10,000 older model Tows missiles were donated, then that would be sufficient for Ukraine to possess an exceptional low-cost and sustainable material solution for their tactical fight going forward.

The older model ITAS is a good enough system that would be perfect for operations against Russian forces, operating in the manner in which they are. While dated, these older models can still provide PID of targets in excess of 3000m. Used in conjunction with UAS assets [cueing], an equipped force can then employ the ITAS as needed [single or SIMO, etc]. Having a large quantity of both the system and munition will likely result in a positive exchange ratio and one that can be sustained far greater than more modern options as they are lethal enough to destroy lesser threat targets, which in turn, would save more expensive munitions for greater threat target[s], thus extending the utility of stocks and increasing overall lethality.

Flexibility and Sustainability

Another factor is flexibility. These platforms are able to be equipped with RWS, ITAS and crew-served weapons, they can transport mortars, etc., far quicker than more complex vehicles, and for significantly less, as well as in greater numbers. They are easier to sustain and maintain as well. These platforms are also very capable of receiving upgrades and are good enough to do the job and they do not require 40 level maintenance, which means Ukrainian forces can learn how to self-sustain them, which means the OR rates will be higher, in turn, meaning they are in the fight more.

These options along with others [mirroring the F-16 training program in Romania*] are fundamental if one is serious about generating options… and options help win wars.

Conclusion

In closing, the current path and plan has not produced victory. It has produced results, but results alone do not translate to a victory. This is merely the equivalent to empty carbs and calorie intake. Instead, what is needed is a plan that produces results that translate into a victory.

This is also required when the costs associated with a decision are tallied up and weighed in comparison to what is and is not gained when it is over.

In simple terms, if you are going to fight someone, make sure you have the stamina to see the fight through to the end beforehand.

Kindly,

Mel Daniels