Ukraine Update: Day 194

Recap/summary of events since the 17th of July.

While the frontlines haven’t moved much overall over the past month and a half, the situation on the ground has been dynamic and kinetic.

Shelling and Strikes

Multiple Russian missile strikes on Odessa, Nikolayev, Kirovgrad, Krivyi Rih, Bakhmutovskoye, Kharkiv, Kiev, Chuhuiv, and Lviv. Russian shelling on Kramatorsk, Bakhmut, Zaporizhzhia, Konstantinovka, Toretsk, Avdiivka, and Berestovoye in particular and all along the line of contact in general. Ukrainian shelling of Nova Kakhovka, Chornobaivka, Kherson, Gorlovka, Energodar, and Donetsk in particular. Ukrainian artillery also active north of Kharkiv city, in support of their Izyum offensive and along the Nikolayev-Kryvi Rih line (in support of the Kherson offensive).

Ukrainian strikes on Novotroitske, Nyzhni Serohozy, Velyka Lhahoveschenka, Chaplynka Gorlovka, and Chkalov.

“Shaping the Battlefield”

All throughout August, both sides developed a lot of small-scale operations along the whole frontline. When the Ukrainian side does this, it is called “Shaping the Battlefield”. However, when the Russian side does this, it is often called “struggling to advance” or “crawling”. At least, this is what we have learned from Twitter experts and the vast majority of the Western Press. All sarcasm aside, both sides have indeed jockeyed for better positions on the battlefield: Reconnaissance, probing of enemy lines, bringing up ammunition, manpower, and hardware near jump-off points. Small offensives and incremental advances were witnessed from both sides.

The Ukrainians have done so ahead of their “Kherson Offensive” (more on this later on) and the Russians have done so moving toward the Seversk-Soledar-Bakhmut line in Donbass. Interestingly, the Russian armed forces in Ukraine switched the centre of gravity of their Donbass offensive from Seversk to Bakhmut.

Donbass

Russian and separatist forces advanced toward Soledar on the 22nd of July with several Ukrainian settlements falling in short order. By the 9th of August, Russians and allies were in control of the town’s industrial area. The Russians manoeuvred and advanced North and South of Bakhmut. Fighting was reported inside Seversk. Wagner troops took Pokrovske on the outskirts of Bakhmut while Russian forces took the Vuhlehirska power station in Svitlodarsk. By the 1st of August, the Russians were 3km from the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut. By the 3rd of August, fighting was taking place inside of Peski, which had been on the receiving end of several thousands of Russian artillery shells daily for almost a week. Peski was finally taken by Russian forces on the 13th of August.

By the 19th of August, Russian forces were advancing toward Pervomaiskoye, threatening the flank of the Ukrainian strongpoint of Avdiivka. By the end of August, Russian troops had advanced into the center of Maryinka while fighting was still taking place on the Eastern suburbs of Bakhmut.

Manpower Shortcomings

To sum it up, both the Ukrainian and Russian sides have shortcomings, mainly a shortage of manpower. The Russians because they haven’t mobilized and the Ukrainians because while they have the numbers on paper, in reality, they do not have the kits to properly equip their men and the time to properly train them. Therefore, both sides rely on force multipliers: Ukraine leans on fortifications and Russia leans on artillery.

The Ukrainian side has fortified the whole Donbass to heights not seen since WWI. We are talking about multiple lines of trenches, bunkers, and dugouts defending in depth; with Ukrainian defensive lines anchored by fortified settlements and towns. Russia cannot hope to quickly penetrate such a defensive network. Instead, Russians and separatists rely on Russian-style Reconnaissance in Force and Reconnaissance Strike Complex (разведивательно-ударный комплех-RYK). They probe the line, often launching localized reconnaissance in force in order to assess Ukrainian positions and strength. They are helped by other means of intel gathering such as drones and EW (radio-location and so on).

Upon contact and/or location, Russian artillery gets involved. We see pinpoint Krasnopol strikes on isolated elements and massive barrage on Ukrainian lines/concentrations. The Russians only progress forward when the Ukrainian lines have been devastated. We are talking about the weight of artillery not seen since WWII. Russian artillery in Ukraine now fires an average of 25,000 shells per day. The war has seen Russian artillery fire 10,000 rounds per day on quiet days, with peaks of 60,000 rounds per day.

Kharkiv Area of Operations

Ukraine launched an offensive in the Kharkiv Oblast in May 2022. The aim was to release pressure on Kharkiv city which was flanked on three sides by Russian forces, placing the whole city within range of Russian artillery. Another aim was to push toward Izyum so as to relieve pressure around the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk area. The ops in Izyum were not successful, but the Ukrainians met with success in and around Kharkiv, forcing the Russians to retreat toward the Russian border.

Incremental Gains

However, the Ukrainians ran out of steam toward June. By the 30th of July, Russian troops were making incremental gains north of Kharkiv, rolling back some of the earlier Ukrainian gains. It is worth noting that the Ukrainians launched an assault toward Gusarovka (near Izyum) toward mid-August and are still pushing toward Izyum as we speak. They haven’t met much success in that endeavor up until now.

The HIMARS Diaries

There has been a lot of “HIMARS hype” online for the past 6 weeks. Every single explosion on the Russian side is suddenly attributed to the HIMARS platform. Although the HIMARS is a welcome addition to the Ukrainian armory, providing Kiev’s forces with a long arm, and although it has had an impact on the Russian side, it is by no means the magical conflict-changing/war-winning wunderwaffe some articles and blogs claim it is.

Ukraine claims its HIMARS hit at least 100 high-value targets, including command posts, air defence sites, radar and communication nodes, and no less than 50 ammunition depots. The strikes hit the Russians hard, especially the ammo dumps, which Russian artillery depends on to fulfill its mission.

In early to mid-August, we saw Russian artillery daily rates of fire drop drastically as a result of those strikes and subsequent Russian measures being taken: For three weeks, Russia dispersed its ammo dumps into smaller ones. This certainly put pressure on Russian logistics which is already stretched in Ukraine. At the same time, this made those ammo dumps harder to detect by NATO intel gathering assets and therefore harder to hit by Ukrainian platforms (HIMARS or other). Each strike on a smaller target also reaping less “return on investment”. By mid to late August, Russian artillery daily rate of fire were back to “pre-HIMARS” levels.

The most high-profile HIMARS strikes of them all are those deployed against the Antonovsky Bridge in Kherson.

The Antonovsky Bridge Strikes

On top of having a strategic value for Kiev, those strikes are also very good PR for the Ukrainian armed forces and the Zelensky leadership: They show the Ukrainians fighting back against Russia and doing so with the help of Western-sourced weapon platforms. Each footage of rockets hitting the bridge and subsequent satellite pictures showing blackened sections on the structure is guaranteed to trend online immediately.

Ukrainian troops first shelled the Antonovsky Bridge on the Dnieper river on the 20th of July (Kherson). Twitter was quick to say “HIMARS” but initial picture assessment of the damage pointed toward 155mm Excalibur shells. The Ukrainians hit the Antonovsky bridge again on the 26th of July, this time using HIMARS and causing serious damage to the road bridge, with the railway portion also being damaged. Russian engineers were seen two days later conducting repairs on the bridge (closed to civilian traffic) while simultaneously working on a pontoon crossing and establishing two ferry crossings.

The reason why the Ukrainians target this bridge and why the Russians try to maintain crossings in-situ is very simple: If Russian supplies can’t cross the Dnieper river here, the alternative (deviation to Kakhovskaya bridge then M17 Kherson-Dzankoy) adds 120km to each trip to resupply Russian forces west of the Dnieper.

The bridge was again hit on the 14th of August, 22nd of August, and several more times since. The strikes on the Antonovsky Bridge (as well as other bridges) are obviously part of Ukraine’s offensive in Kherson, which is discussed below.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Diaries

Both Ukraine and Russia accuse one another of shelling the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant situated in the town of Energodar. Western officials and media support the Ukrainian narrative. Ukraine accuses Russia of having moved a whole BTG on the power plant grounds. At the same time, Ukraine accuses Russia of shelling the plant’s surroundings and of preparing a provocation/radioactive leak.

Power Plant Control

Meanwhile, Russia seems to be working on disconnecting the plant from the Ukrainian grid and connecting it instead to the Russian grid, alongside the local (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) grids. Should they manage to disconnect the plant from the Ukrainian grid, they will deprive 25% of Ukraine of electricity.

NATO has confirmed that a Russian provocation/radioactive leak at the Ukrainian plant would trigger Article 5 of the alliance’s charter. Ukraine and its allies are seemingly pushing for a demilitarization of the plant and its surroundings. This would play in favour of Ukraine, which has sought to internationalize this conflict before it even started. It would also change the situation on the ground when Kiev has been unable to do so militarily: From their position in and around Energodar, the Russians are able to both keep pressure on Zaporizhzhia city and shelling the Ukrainian garrison of Kryvyi Rih’s rear area.

The Kherson Offensive

The Ukrainian side deployed around 20,000 men facing the Kherson Oblast around June time. There were skirmishes and local ops, including a thrust that enabled Ukrainian troops to force a crossing of the Ingulets River and establish a bridgehead at Davidyv Brid. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians, they did not follow through and the bridgehead was slowly reduced over the following weeks. Further south, Ukrainian troops crept closer to Kherson City.

On the 26th of July, the Russians reported the arrival of additional Ukrainian troops and hardware west of the Dnieper River, in anticipation of a Ukrainian offensive. This was followed by small Russian operations in the South that rolled back some of the previous Ukrainian gains between Nikolayev and Kherson. As the pendulum swung the other way around, Ukrainian troops were pushed back away from Kherson City and Russian troops came closer to Nikolayev, going as far as Bahodatne.

Throughout August, Ukrainian forces proceeded to hit the Antonovsky Bridge in Kherson (See above), the bridge near the Nova Khakovka hydroelectric plant and the Daryevsky Bridge over the Ingulets River in order to impede Russian logistics west of the Dnieper: 20,000 Russian troops were estimated to be positioned there prior to the Kherson offensive.

Ukrainian Operations Behind Russian Lines

There were also several Ukrainian operations behind Russian lines, including in Crimea and Russia proper. On the 9th of August, a Ukrainian attack on the Saki Airbase in Crimea destroyed or damaged at least 13 Russian aircraft. Saki is home to the 43rd Russian Independent Naval Attack Aviation Regiment (43 OMShAP) which flies Su-24 and Su-30. It seems an initial explosion/fire subsequently spread to bombs and other ammunition that were stored pretty carelessly near the planes. At least 4 large detonations were heard/observed, with a dozen detonations heard in total. The cause of this incident is disputed. Some think this is the work of Ukrainian special forces/saboteurs operating behind enemy lines. Others think this is the work of drones. Nevertheless, while 13 planes represent a small percentage of the platforms Russia can deploy, it still represents a big dent in the capabilities of the Naval Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet.

A fire erupted at a Russian ammo depot in Maiskoye in Crimea on the 16th of August. Damage was also done on nearby power lines and railways. The Russian authorities called it an act of sabotage. Finally, a giant fire occurred at a Russian ammo dump in Russia (Belgorod region) on the 18th of August.

The HQ of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was also attacked by Ukrainian drones and drone incursions over Crimea are now an almost daily occurrence.

Russian Reinforcements and Ukrainian Offensives

Meanwhile, Russian reinforcements were streaming toward Kherson, in anticipation of the long-awaited Ukrainian counter-attack in that area. The number of troops and hardware sent by Russia toward Kherson (est. 30 BTGs) made some Ukrainian officials think that Russia could be preparing an offensive toward Nikolayev of Krivyi Rih, rather than just passively defend in the face of a potential Ukrainian offensive.

On the 29th of August, Ukraine launched its Kherson offensive in the south, along the Nikolayev-Kryvyi Rih line. Ukrainian forces pushed hard between Kherson city and Nikolayev and actually pushed Russian troops back in several places, including Kyselivka but there was no breakthrough.

Further north, Ukrainian troops advancing south from Krivyi Rih took Vysokopillya. The main Ukrainian success seems to have been a crossing at the Ingulets opposite Davidyv Brid (again!). From there, they have expanded their bridgehead towards Sukhyi Stavok and Andreevka to a depth of 6km to 10km (depending on sources). This could have been a Ukrainian breakthrough but the Ukrainian forces did not have the resources necessary to push on. It seems the Russians are slowly containing the bridgehead and some sources are even talking about a potential encirclement of the Ukrainian bridgehead into a pocket. Take this with a pinch of salt as the situation is still ongoing and is therefore fluid.

Early Assessments and Losses

Early assessments of the Kherson (summer) offensive seem to vindicate our contributor/admin Mel Daniels who has long said Ukraine lacks the capabilities to coordinate ops above battalion level. The offensive is ambitious in scope and a considerable number of troops (including reserves from Odessa) and hardware seem to have been dedicated to this operation. Nevertheless, it seems the Ukrainians have incurred some serious losses in the past week for what amounts to very little territorial gains, all things said and done. The offensive is by no means over, but it already feels like there won’t be any major breakthrough (unless things go very wrong very quickly for the Russians) and the tempo of operations is already slowing down.

After months worth of hype, everybody was waiting/expecting/willing to see a Ukrainian Blitzkrieg in the south of the country toward Kherson. However, considering the previous losses in Ukrainian manpower (and skills associated/pre-war training) as well as hardware losses, it would have been surprising to see Ukraine being able to develop and coordinate such large-scale operations. As such, the vast theatre-wide armoured offensive and breakthrough Western pundits often dream about on Twitter is unlikely to materialize. What we are seeing now IS the Kherson offensive.

Ukrainian artillery has supported Ukrainian troops with an increased and sustained rate of fire along the Nikolayev-Kryvyi Rih frontline and one believes they won’t be able to keep this up for much longer. Without artillery support, Ukrainian troops will eventually see their progress slow down and eventually stop. The offensive is in its first week. We might see Kiev push on for another 7 to 10 days after which we expect their offensive to start running out of steam. The Ukrainian leadership possibly knew this and that is maybe why they waited until the end of summer before launching this offensive: A big push limited in time before Autumn’s rain and mud freeze the frontline in place.

Changing Narratives from Kiev

The narrative from Kiev is already slowly changing. The offensive is now an operation destined to “grind” Russian troops and inflict “attrition” on them while degrading their capabilities. The fact that it is the side with the smallest reserve in manpower that is trying to play the attrition game is puzzling, to say the least.

Saying that, the Russian side is probably unable to develop large-scale offensives as well: The Russian military supplies reinforcements in men and hardware to its units in Ukraine through an ad-hoc system that had to be adopted in the absence of a declaration of war (therefore no mobilization). Those reinforcements provide the Russian military in Ukraine with only just the capability to hold on to the vast frontline, replenish losses, and advance locally. When they do so, the Russians only progress thanks to their local superiority in air power and artillery. No large-scale offensive/armoured thrust is to be expected on that side either!

NATO Supplies

NATO keeps on depleting its strategic military reserves in order to supply Ukraine. An estimated 500,000 X 155mm US shells have been sent to Ukraine out of a total US inventory of roughly 2.7 million shells… Meaning that Ukraine has absorbed/fired in 6 months just short of 20% of the total amount of 155mm shells the US has produced in the past 20 years!

UK and US Aid

The UK announced that it would be sending 20 X M109 SPGs, 36 X L119 105mm guns, and 50,000 Soviet Era rounds (Basically 5 days worth of ammunition) to Ukraine. London