Historical context: Struggle of Far East empires.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a new empire was rising in Asia. Japan sought to bring the Far East under its dominion, securing access to the vast resources required by its growing industry. Russia, a much older empire, also had ambitions in Manchuria, from which it could extend its influence towards the Pacific.
By February 1904, without a formal declaration of war, the Japanese battle fleet launched a surprise attack on the Russian Far East Squadron at anchor off Port Arthur, thus initiating the Russo-Japanese war. As an island nation conducting a campaign in Manchuria, Japan needed command of the sea to maintain communications and supply its armies on the mainland. Neutralising the Russian Navy was therefore an essential first objective.
Although inconclusive at first, the attack had the effect of trapping the Russian First Pacific Squadron in port, where it remained relatively safe under protection of shore batteries. This lent Japan control of the sea, allowing Japanese armies to be landed on Manchuria. After a succession of engagements, deserving of an article all by themselves, the Japanese managed to defeat the Russians at sea and disable the remaining fleet in harbour by use of heavy mortars.
When it became clear to the Russians that the First Pacific Squadron could not break out of Port Arthur, another fleet, designated Second Pacific Squadron, was assembled from Russia’s northern and Baltic fleets, and sent across the world under the command of admiral Z.P.Rozhestvensky to relief the trapped squadron.
Technological context: The Pre-Dreadnought Battleship.
By the time of the Russo-Japanese war, the battleship was the principal unit of a battle fleet. Heavily armed and well protected, it was designed to maintain its place in the line of battle under heavy fire. Cruisers supported the battleships by scouting ahead of the main body and providing additional firepower where required. Smaller destroyers carried torpedoes, then still a developing weapon, and also performed dispatch and liaison duties between major warships.
A pre-dreadnought battleship’s main armament usually consisted of four 10- or 12-inch guns mounted in 2 gun turrets, one forward and one aft. Contemporary fire-control and sighting limitations made hits against moving targets difficult. Secondary batteries consequently played an important role in inflicting damage through sustained fire.
Secondary guns were commonly of 6-inch calibre and mounted in casemates along the ship’s sides. Their volume of fire helped compensate for limited accuracy, although individual hits rarely caused severe structural damage. The smaller anti-torpedo-boat battery commonly included 12-pounder (76 mm) quick-firing guns, though smaller calibres were also used. These weapons were intended to keep torpedo boats beyond effective attacking range.
At the time, most navies, including the Russians, fired as the ship’s roll brought the guns onto the target. This restricted the rate of fire because the gunlayer had to wait for the correct point in the roll. In 1899, however, the British developed a method known as continuous aim. Using telescopic sights, gunlayers kept their guns trained and elevated on the target throughout the ship’s roll.
Trials reportedly produced a 600 per cent improvement in hit rate aboard the cruisers on which the method was tested. Continuous aim required extensive training, and by 1904 only the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy had adopted it. Its advantages would become apparent in battle.
The gunnery engagements were held in ranges no longer than 6000 yards (approximately 5400 meters), as this was as far as the weaponry of the time could fire with any hope of hitting a target, for most of the duration of the engagement at Tsushima however, the battle lines were at closer ranges.
Torpedoes then also had limited speed and range. A range of roughly three kilometres could be achieved at about 15 knots, while higher speed settings reduced endurance. Hits were therefore most likely against damaged ships whose ability to manoeuvre had already been impaired.
Order of Battle:
The Russian Fleet:
The Second Pacific Squadron represented the main available fighting strength of the Baltic Fleet. Treaty restrictions prevented the Black Sea Fleet from joining it. As the prospect of linking up with the First Pacific Squadron diminished, Russia assembled a Third Pacific Squadron from older, obsolete ships and dispatched it as a reinforcement, against Rozhestvensky’s wishes.
Second Pacific Squadron:
The four Borodino-class battleships – Borodino, Imperator Aleksander III, Orel and Kniaz Suvorov – formed the fighting core of the squadron. Very modern vessels at the time, the last of them entering service in 1904. Their armament comprised four 12-inch guns in 2 gun turrets fore and aft, twelve 6-inch guns in six 2 gun turrets, three on each side, and twenty 3-inch guns for defence against torpedo boats. The low mounting of the latter made them difficult to operate in heavy seas.
Designed to displace 13,500 tons, the ships were several thousand tons overweight when fully loaded. This adversely affected their stability and speed, reducing their practical performance below the nominal maximum of 17.5 knots. At full load, their Krupp cemented main armour belts were submerged, leaving the waterline inadequately protected. Their French-influenced tumblehome hull form offered limited reserve buoyancy and contributed to a dangerous loss of stability when the ships flooded. Their recent entry into service also meant that many crew members had not yet become fully proficient in operating their ships’ systems.
Commissioned in 1901, Osliabia was a 12,683-ton battleship of a different design, intended to deliver a high volume of fire. She carried four 10-inch guns in 2 gun turrets fore and aft and eleven 6-inch guns, five on each side and one firing ahead. Her anti-torpedo-boat battery comprised twenty 3-inch guns. She had a maximum speed of 18 knots, but her main armour belt was also submerged at full load, a problem shared by several Russian designs.
Here the modern capital ships end, the rest of the squadron being composed of an earlier and obsolete generation of ships.
Sissoi Veliki, a 10,400-ton battleship commissioned in 1896. She carried four 12-inch guns in 2 gun turrets, but her secondary battery comprised only six 6-inch guns, three on each side. Twelve 3-pounder (47 mm) guns provided defence against torpedo boats. She could reach 15.7 knots, though at the cost of high coal consumption.
Navarin was a 10,200-ton battleship commissioned in 1896, though her design was already considered obsolete. Her four 12-inch guns were arranged in 2 gun turrets fore and aft, as aboard Sissoi Veliki, but were less powerful. She also carried eight 6-inch guns, four on each side, and eight 3-pounders for defence against torpedo boats. Her maximum speed was 15 knots.
Admiral Nakhimov was an armoured cruiser rather than a battleship. Completed in 1888, she displaced 8,500 tons. Her main armament consisted of 8-inch guns in two gun mountings, supported by ten 6-inch guns, five on each side, in unprotected batteries. Her maximum speed was 14 knots, and her armour protection was inadequate for service in the battle line.
The Third Pacific Squadron, under Admiral Nebogatov, was entirely composed of obsolete ships. Rozhestvensky regarded them as more of a hindrance than a reinforcement and referred to them as the “self-sinkers”.
Imperator Nikolai I, Nebogatov’s flagship, was a 9,672-ton battleship completed in 1892 and modernised in 1898. She carried two 12-inch guns in a 2 gun turret forward, together with a battery of 9-inch and 6-inch guns: two 9-inch and four 6-inch guns on each side. Sixteen 3-pounders completed her gun armament. Her maximum speed was 15 knots.
Lastly came the three coastal-defence ships Admiral Ushakov, Admiral Seniavin and General Admiral Graf Apraksin. Displacing approximately 5,000 tons, they carried 10-inch main guns and four 4.7-inch secondary guns. Their maximum speed was about 15 knots, but they had not been designed for sustained operations on the open sea.
The supporting force included three modern cruisers capable of more than 19 knots—Svietlana, Oleg and Aurora—and two older cruisers, Dimitri Donskoi and Vladimir Monomakh, whose speed of about 15 knots limited their usefulness. Two fast scout cruisers operated with the destroyers, which were organised into two divisions of four ships each. Five armed merchant ships completed the force. Taken together, these vessels formed an uneven supporting force with widely differing capabilities.
The Japanese Fleet:
In contrast to the largely obsolete Russian force, Admiral Tōgō commanded a fleet composed mainly of modern, well-designed ships with experienced crews. The Japanese had repaired the damage sustained in the Battle of the Yellow Sea and were ready when the Russians arrived. Armoured cruisers supplemented the limited number of battleships in the line of battle.
Tōgō’s First Division comprised all four Japanese battleships and two armoured cruisers.
Tōgō’s flagship, Mikasa, displaced 15,600 tons. Launched in Britain in 1900, she incorporated contemporary British battleship design practice. Her armament comprised four 12-inch guns in 2 gun turrets fore and aft, fourteen 6-inch guns, seven on each side, and twenty 12-pounders for defence against torpedo boats. Krupp cemented armour protected her belt and barbettes. Capable of 18 knots, she was among the best-protected and most effective battleships of her time.
Fuji was somewhat older launched in 1897. Displacing 12,500-ton battleship launched in 1897. Her four 12-inch guns were mounted in 2 gun turrets fore and aft. Loading restrictions required the turrets to be trained fore and aft, limiting the rate of fire. Her secondary battery comprised ten 6-inch guns, supplemented by sixteen 12-pounders. Her maximum speed was 18 knots.
Asahi was a 15,200-ton battleship completed in 1900. She carried four 12-inch guns, fourteen 6-inch guns and twenty 12-pounders. Her armour was less advanced than Mikasa’s, but effective internal subdivision had enabled her to survive striking a Russian mine earlier in the war. Her maximum speed was 18 knots.
Shikishima, launched in 1900, displaced 14,850 tons. Her armament comprised four 12-inch guns in 2 gun turrets and fourteen 6-inch guns. Like the other Japanese battleships, she could reach 18 knots.
The Japanese battle line could therefore maintain a substantially higher speed than the Russian formation, which was restricted to less than 15 knots. This advantage allowed Tōgō to retain the initiative and exert considerable control troughout the duration of the battle.
As we consider pre-dreadnought gunnery and the importance of the 6 inch gun, we must not forget that the large armoured cruiser was a capital ship as powerful as the battleship although less armoured, and the Japanese had 8 of them. Their armament was arguably more effective in battle then that of the battleships, as their 8-inch guns could employ continuous aim, making them more effective at hitting distant targets than the heavier 10- and 12-inch guns under contemporary operating conditions.
Kasuga and Nisshin were Italian-built armoured cruisers displacing 7,700 tons. Kasuga carried a single 10-inch gun forward and two 8-inch guns in a 2 gun turret aft. Nisshin instead carried 2 gun 8-inch turrets fore and aft. Each ship had fourteen 6-inch secondary guns and could reach 20 knots.
The remaining armoured cruisers formed the Second Division under Vice-Admiral Kamimura.
Idzumo and Iwate displaced 9,750 tons and were completed in 1901. Each carried four 8-inch guns in 2 gun turrets and fourteen 6-inch guns. Their substantial armament made them valuable additions to the battle line, while their maximum speed of 20.75 knots exceeded that of the battleships.
Asama and Tokiwa were of a similar design. Built in Britain and launched in 1899, they had a maximum speed restricted to 19 knots for safety reasons.
Adzuma displaced 9,370 tons and was completed in France in 1900. She resembled the preceding ships but carried two fewer 6-inch guns. Yakumo, a 9,646-ton cruiser built in Germany in the same year, carried a similar armament.
The supporting force comprised eight cruisers, most capable of more than 20 knots, five divisions of torpedo-boat destroyers and additional dispatch vessels.
Also deployed were older obsolete vessels in support duties, such as the third squadron under command of Vice-Admiral Kataoka, that being three Matsushima class cruisers, an old design displacing 4,217 tons and carrying a single heavy Canet gun with eleven 4.7-inch guns; the former Chinese ironclad Chin Yen; and six older cruisers dating from the 1890s. Twenty-seven small torpedo boats were also deployed.
Lastly the Auxiliary Squadron comprised three torpedo boats and seven auxiliary cruisers, which Tōgō employed for scouting.
The Engagement:
Encounter:
Once Rozhestvensky realised that the First Pacific Squadron was doomed and Port Arthur could no longer be relieved, he changed his objective, intending to reach Vladivostok without engaging the main Japanese fleet. If an opportunity arose, he would attack isolated enemy units to secure a politically useful success.
The admiral was aware of the poor shape of his fleet, not adequately drilled in gunnery nor manoeuvre, and limited in its speed and manoeuvrability by the likes of Admiral Nakhimov and other obsolete vessels. Any decisive battle would at that point favour the Japanese, and it was in Rozhestvensky’s best interest to avoid such a battle. Reaching Vladivostok would preserve his fleet as a fighting force, allowing it to contest Japanese command of the sea and await a more favourable opportunity.
To encourage Tōgō to divide his forces, Rozhestvensky sent two auxiliary cruisers towards the Japanese coast and another two to Shanghai. His main body would proceed through the Tsushima Strait towards Vladivostok, engaging any opposition encountered without breaking formation, or so went the plan anyway.
The Russian heavy ships were organised into three divisions of four ships each. The four Borodino-class battleships led one column, followed by Osliabia, Sissoi Veliki, Navarin and Admiral Nakhimov in the Second Division. The Third Pacific Squadron formed the Third Division in a parallel column, followed by the First Cruiser Division. Fast cruisers and two destroyer divisions screened the formation, although the destroyers were to join the transports if battle developed. Auxiliary cruisers scouted ahead.
Knowing that his ships were faster and his formation more manoeuvrable, Tōgō intended to cross the Russian line’s T with his First Squadron while his Second Squadron attacked from another direction. Concentrating fire on a limited section of the enemy line would allow him to overwhelm it rapidly. He deployed a screen of cruisers and auxiliary cruisers to detect the Russians along their most likely route through the Tsushima Strait.
Japan urgently needed a decisive victory. Sustaining the war was placing severe pressure on the country, and a major naval success could bring Russia to the negotiating table on favourable terms.
At 04:45 on 27 May, the auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru sighted the Russian formation and transmitted its position by wireless. By 13:39, Tōgō had established visual contact.
Signal flag Z was then hoisted aboard Mikasa, conveying the message: “The Empire’s fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty.”
The Russians formed a single line of battle, with the Third Division following the First and Second Divisions. The cruisers and transports took station to starboard, with the destroyers between them and the battle line.
The daylight action:
The Russians opened fire while the Japanese were turning to port to gain a favourable position against the Russian van. They scored few hits, and their shells caused limited damage. The Japanese then opened fire at about 6,000 yards, concentrating on Osliabia and Suvorov with devastating results.
Employing continuous aim, the Japanese 6-inch guns fired high-explosive shells filled with Shimose explosive. Bursts ignited wood, fabric and paint, and swept exposed decks with splinters. Occasional hits from 8- and 12-inch shells, albeit rare, added to the damage.
The fleets continued on parallel courses, exchanging fire at about 5,500 yards. The Russians manoeuvred to prevent the Japanese from crossing their T, but shell damage and fires increasingly impaired their return fire.
By 14:40, the Japanese had closed the range and scored two further 12-inch hits on Osliabia. She turned to starboard and stopped. An attempt at counter-flooding her port magazines to restore an even keel failed, ending whatever remaining stability she had. The vessel then developed a severe list to port before sinking about forty minutes later. Destroyers rescued survivors. Shortly afterwards, Suvorov’s main bridge was destroyed and her steering gear jammed. The flagship turned to starboard and fell out of line.
The fleets resumed their exchange of fire at about 3,500 yards. The Japanese retained the advantage through the greater effectiveness of their shells. Their Second Division crossed the Russian line’s T and maintained concentrated fire on the leading ships.
The Russians’ attempts to follow the damaged Suvorov and then resume their original course also caused confusion among the Japanese. At about 15:10, the fleets temporarily lost contact. Tōgō feared that an unseen part of the Russian force might threaten his rear. By 15:45, another hit on Suvorov’s conning tower had wounded Rozhestvensky in the head and left him unconscious. At 15:49, Tōgō had re-formed his line in its previous order and was steaming back towards the Russians.
The fleets met again at 16:00. The Russians altered course to prevent their T from being crossed, leaving Suvorov exposed to the Japanese First Division after she had already endured prolonged fire from the Second. The First Division concentrated on the crippled flagship, allowing the rest of the Russian force to increase its distance and make use of the mist to obscure themselves.
Tōgō subsequently turned to port to protect his rear against a Russian manoeuvre, but in doing so lost contact. During another turn to port at about 17:00, Japanese destroyers found Suvorov still making 10 knots and hit her with a torpedo. The return of the Russian fleet, which had turned to starboard and resumed a northerly course to rescue the flagship, interrupted further attacks.
By 17:50, the Russians had re-formed their line and transferred Rozhestvensky from Suvorov to the destroyer Buini. Command of the fleet was formally transferred to Nebogatov. Borodino now led the line, while the damaged Aleksander III steamed on a parallel course to starboard. The transports were on the starboard quarter and the cruisers to port. The fleets continued firing, though with limited effect at about 6,500 yards.
By 18:50, Aleksander III had fallen out of line to port, capsized and sunk. The account records 836 men lost and four survivors.
As daylight faded, Tōgō ordered his ships to cease fire. At 19:20, Fuji fired a final salvo that had already been loaded. A 12-inch shell struck Borodino’s forward magazine, causing a major explosion. The battleship capsized and sank; only one man from her complement of 855 was rescued.
With Japanese torpedo boats blocking their route, the surviving Russian ships turned south-east.
Meanwhile, Kataoka’s Third Division attacked the stricken Suvorov. Several heavy shells struck her, followed by three torpedoes fired at approximately 300 yards. Such close attacks were possible because shellfire had disabled most of her 3-inch guns. The torpedoes detonated a magazine, and at about 19:30 Suvorov capsized and sank with all those still aboard.
Night Action:
After dark, Tōgō sent his torpedo boats against the Russian fleet. Heavy seas made attacks difficult, but two older cruisers were hit and later sank.
Navarin, already stopped in the water by battle damage, was also hit. According to this account, those initial hits did not sink her. She subsequently got under way but struck two mines laid ahead of her by Japanese destroyers and sank the following morning.
Sissoi Veliki sustained a torpedo hit aft and began taking on water. She surrendered the next morning and sank at about 09:30.
Russian Surrender:
At about 10:30 the following morning, the Japanese fleet opened fire on the remnants of the Russian line at approximately 7,500 yards. The surviving Russian ships could not reply effectively. Most carried obsolete guns, while Orel, the only remaining modern battleship, was badly damaged. The Japanese were encircling the Russian formation, with all their major warships still present.
Recognising that further resistance was hopeless, Nebogatov ordered his ships to surrender, despite the risk of execution for doing so.
Rozhestvensky was captured later that day when the destroyer Byedovi surrendered to pursuing Japanese vessels.
The only substantial group of Russian ships to avoid sinking or capture comprised the cruisers Aurora, Oleg and Femtchug. They escaped south and were interned by the Americans at Manila.
Principal Conclusions:
Firstly we can observe how significant was the Japanese advantage in speed over the Russians, whose line was often steaming at speeds as low as 9 knots during the battle. This advantage allowed the Japanese to dictate the range and relative position of the engagement, having the Russians on the defensive attempting to avoid having their T crossed. It was also an advantage as the fleeing Russian formation was unable to break contact and ended up encircled.
Another advantage held by the Japanese was their superior artillery. The better drilled gun crews employing continuous aim managed a higher rate of fire and superior accuracy then that of their Russian counterparts. Also relevant was the ammunition employed, as Togo’s ships made constant use of small calibre high explosive fired at the superstructure and upper decks of enemy ships at ranges where armour piercing would have been ineffective. This tactic managed to set fires and destroy exposed guns and rangefinders, wrecking the Russian capacity to lay accurate fire and in many cases even to hold formation, as well as disrupting the action of damage control parties.
The effects of the Japanese shelling can be described by the words of Captain 2nd rank Vladimir Semenoff, on board the Suvorov: “It seemed as if these were mines, not shells, which were striking the ship’s side and falling on the deck. They burst as soon as they touched anything — the moment they encountered the least impediment in their flight. Handrails, funnel guys, topping lifts of the boats’ derricks, were quite sufficient to cause a thoroughly efficient burst. The steel plates and superstructure on the upper deck were torn to pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders were crumpled up into rings, and guns were literally hurled from their mountings.
Such havoc would never be caused by the simple impact of a shell, still less by that of its splinters. It could only be caused by the force of the explosion. The Japanese had apparently succeeded in realizing what the Americans had endeavored to attain in inventing their “Vesuvium.”
In addition to this, there was the unusual high temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst. Of course, the steel did not I burn, but the paint on it did. Such almost non – combustible materials as hammocks, and rows of boxes, drenched with water, flared up in a moment. At times it was impossible to see anything with glasses, owing to everything being so distorted with the quivering, heated air. “
Russian return fire consisted mainly of armour-piercing shells directed at the Japanese ships’ hulls. Inaccurate fire and limited shell effectiveness restricted the damage inflicted. Tōgō continued to command from Mikasa’s open bridge rather than withdrawing to the armoured conning tower, remaining personally exposed throughout the action.
Also to be observed is the scarcity of 12 inch hits on either side, although their few hits had the devastating effect. Such hits sunk Borodino and crippled Osliabia. It must be noted that the Russians possessed 42 guns of 10 inches or more against 17 on the Japanese line. The Japanese heavy guns, however, reportedly achieved approximately twice the rate of fire, and the Japanese held the edge in every single exange of fire in the battle.
Of the 87 torpedoes reportedly fired during the battle, only eight hit, most striking ships that had already been crippled, such as Suvorov and Navarin. Vladimir Monomakh was the only cruiser said to have sunk primarily as a result of torpedo damage; other torpedoed ships had already sustained extensive shell damage. These results illustrate the limitations of contemporary torpedoes, which were more effective against disabled ships than against vessels able to maintain speed and manoeuvre freely.
Lastly attention must be given to the deficiencies of the design of the Russian battleships of the Borodino-class. Flooding could rapidly reduce their ability to remain upright and lead to capsizing. That happened mainly due to two reasons: Firstly the tumblehome design of their hull, which is normally stable enough, lacks reserve buoyancy and could suffer a substantial reduction in righting moment as the ships settled deeper in the water. Secondly, the ships were already overweight from the start, which aggravated the deficiencies of the hull design.
Much of the blame for the defeat fell on Rozhestvensky, who accepted responsibility at his court martial after returning to Russia. According to this account, his death sentence was commuted by the Tsar because he had been unconscious for much of the battle. Nebogatov, who had subsequently assumed command, was also court-martialled and spent time in prison. Both men’s careers and reputations were ruined.
It would be however at least partially unfair to lay the blame on the admirals. The Russian high command had sent a heterogeneous fleet of obsolete ships and newly commissioned, untested vessels halfway around the world. Their inadequately trained crews were expected to fight an experienced, well-equipped enemy that had already defeated another Russian fleet.
Broader consequences:
On the words of Sir Julian Corbett the battle of Tsushima was “perhaps the most decisive and complete naval victory in history”. The losses recorded in this account were twelve Russian major warships sunk and four captured, with 4,830 men killed, 5,907 taken prisoner and 1,862 interned for the remainder of the war. Japanese losses were three torpedo boats—two lost to Russian gunfire and one following violent manoeuvring—and 117 men.
Tsushima shattered Russian naval power in the Far East and secured Japanese command of the surrounding seas. Its political consequences were still more significant. The defeat increased the pressure on Russia to negotiate, allowing an exhausted Japan to conclude the war at a favourable moment.
Russia had assembled a substantial army in Manchuria and could supply it through the Trans-Siberian Railway. A prolonged land campaign might therefore have improved Russia’s position. Without the decisive victory at Tsushima, Japan risked losing the gains it had secured during the war.
Sources:
“Grove, Eric. Big Fleet Actions. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1991”
“Forczyk, Robert. Russian battleship vs Japanese battleship. Oxford. Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2009”
For the complete extract of Capt. Semenoff’s notes visit the website:
